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The Market For Justice, The “Litigation Explosion,” 
And The “Verdict Bubble”:  
A Closer Look at Vanishing Trials
Frederic N. Smalkin1
Frederic N.C. Smalkin2
“A jury consists of twelve persons chosen to
decide who has the better lawyer.”
Robert Frost
Recently, a respected jurist has lamented the declining number of federal jury 
trials.  Chief Judge William Young of the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, writing in the Federal Bar Journal,3 pointed out that jury trials in federal 
civil cases declined 26% in the decade between 1989 and 1999, which he attributed to 
four factors: the district court judiciary’s “loss of focus” on the core function of trying 
jury cases; the business community’s loss of interest in jury adjudication (“opting out of 
the legal system altogether” in favor of arbitration); Congress’s “marginalizing the 
district court judiciary”; and the “Europization [sic] of American Law,” which seems to 
refer to the expanding role of administrative adjudication in American law.4
In our view, although Judge Young has correctly observed that the data show a 
decline in the number of completed federal civil jury trials,5 and has also given some 
explanations for the numbers, he did not give sufficient credit to a major, underlying 
issue, which involves the economics of adjudication, beyond the business community’s 
“loss of interest” in jury trials.  We shall demonstrate that there is a marked increase in 
the use of alternative fora, especially arbitration, which is inevitably drawing down the 
number of cases that would otherwise be filed, as well as those eventually reaching trial.  
Although the decline in trials has come both in trials concluded before judges and juries, 
arbitration, as Young recognizes, has a special role in displacing jury trials, as it offers a 
more predictable and far less expensive dispute resolution mechanism than is provided by 
trial of facts to a randomly selected, broadly representative jury panel.  
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We shall also demonstrate that legal history teaches that there has long been 
market competition among alternative fora; that fora, as well as litigants, are themselves 
motivated by economic considerations that make them more (or less) willing to exercise 
jurisdiction; and that dispute resolution will tend, over time, to move toward the most 
economically efficient forum.  Although increased judicial “activism,” e.g., increased 
enthusiasm for resolving cases by summary judgment, has been identified as a major 
culprit in the diversion of cases from trial,6 rather little attention seems to have been paid 
to the role of jury verdicts – especially high-end “outliers” – as a factor in the shrinking 
numbers of trials. 
The Numbers
Certainly, as observed by Judge Young, the number of federal civil jury trials7
showed a remarkable decline of more than one-fourth in the decade 1989-99.8   The 
authors have brought the numbers up to date, through fiscal year 2002.  The decline has 
continued, as Table I below clearly demonstrates:
6 See infra, note 59.
7 As reported on a fiscal-year basis by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html.  See Tables C-7, Appendix: Detailed Statistical Tables, 
Judicial Business of the United States Courts, FY 1997-2002.
8 The number of civil filings has, in contrast, showed remarkably little fluctuation from 1993 through 2002.  
The figures are: 1993-226,165; 1994-236,391; 1995-248,335; 1996-269,132; 1997-272,027; 1998-256,787; 
1999-260,271; 2000-259,517; 2001-250,907; 2002-274,841.  These figures readily lend themselves to a 
conclusion that many cases are simply not filed in the Article III forum in the first place, because, given a 
growing population (both in the general population and in the ranks of lawyers) and significant yearly 
increases in statutory civil remedies from new legislation without offsetting repeal of older remedies, one 









1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Fiscal Year
Table I
Trials 1997-2002: Jury and Nonjury
Nonjury
Jury
It is interesting to note from Table I that the decline in completed trials is not confined to 
jury trials, but extends to completed trials, both jury and nonjury, which correlate with an 
r=0.987.9  The phenomenon of declining trials of both sorts was not addressed by Young,
nor does it follow that the jury trial alone is the victim of the developments he decries in 
his article.  Certainly, the “Europization” of American law – to take an example of the 
factors identified by Young – strikes equally at jury and nonjury trials, as it involves the 
utilization of a non-Article III forum to resolve disputes.  Statistics reported by the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts do not distinguish between nonjury 
trials in which no jury was requested at the outset and those in which a jury demand was 
dropped before trial.  It has been the experience of the principal author that, because a 
jury trial is waived if not requested in the earliest stages of the case (often before the 
identity of the assigned judge is known),10 jury demands made early in the case are often 
waived at the pre-trial conference or otherwise before the commencement of trial.  
Waivers are frequently made because of difficulties in scheduling jury trials in light of 
the federal courts’ burgeoning (some would say “crippling”) criminal docket; non-jury 
trials are faster to try and easier to schedule.  Thus, the number of non-jury trials 
completed is not reliably indicative of the parties’ intent at the time of case filing (or 
shortly thereafter), when the choice of adjudicative forum is made.  It is at that early 
9 The Administrative Office reports from which Table I is compiled do not report trials conducted by 
Magistrate Judges.  Interestingly, the numbers of jury and non-jury trials conducted by Magistrate Judges, 
with consent of the litigants, see 28 U.S.C. section 636(c) (2000), show a decline from highs of 892 and 
656, respectively, in 1998 to 472 and 487, respectively, in 2002, as reported in Table S-17, Judicial 
Business of the United States Courts, supra note 1. 
10 See Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 38(b) and (d).
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choice point that economic considerations associated with the jury trial, such as increased 
risk due to damage award variance, increased transactional costs, and the inevitable loss 
of confidentiality inherent in a public trial, are most likely determinative and, therefore, 
strike equally at all cases in the Article III courts.  Thus, we may confine our present 
examination to the disappearing federal jury trial.
Where has the litigation gone?  One answer might be that the number of trials 
completed has declined simply because federal civil trials are getting postponed more 
often than in the past.  This was investigated by the authors, but was found not to be the 
case, as the reported statistics show only a 2.8% increase in median time from filing to 
trial in civil cases between 1997 and 2002.11
A second answer is that cases that used to be filed as federal jury cases are going 
elsewhere, i.e., they are being filed in state courts or being arbitrated, instead.  Because of 
the nature of case statistical reporting and the jurisdictional differences among states and 
between state and federal courts (including differing programs of court-annexed ADR), it 
is impracticable to gather comparable data from all the state courts that serve as 
alternative judicial fora to the federal courts to test whether the observed decline in 
federal trials has been accompanied by an offsetting increase in comparable state trials.12
It is, however, possible to look to at least one major alternative to the federal trial 
– jury or nonjury – and that is the number of arbitrations instituted with the American 
Arbitration Association, set forth below in Table II:
11 U.S. District Court – Judicial Caseload Profile, Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
(2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2002.pl.  See also, ERIK MILLER, TRENDS IN 
CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE  1985 tbl. 2 (1996) (showing declines in jury trials from 1985-94 in 11 of 15 
states studied).
12  There is some evidence that there has been a decline in cases going to trial in at least some state courts, 
as well.  In December, 2003, the American Bar Association’s Section of Litigation’s Civil Justice Initiative
sponsored a conference called “Vanishing Trials,” prompted by the observation that “[d]uring the last 15 
years a federal court trend that has been mirrored in many states is the drastic decline in the number of 
cases tried to verdict.”  ABA Communiqué, October 2003, available at
http://www.abanet.org/media/communique/oct03.html.  The thoughtful papers presented at the conference 
by, among others,  Professors Galanter and Resnick are available at 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/taskforces/cji/nosearch/home.html.
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Though, because of the number of dependent variables involved, the data cannot 
prove a direct relationship between the steep, steady fall-off in federal civil trials and the 
steep, steady increase in arbitrations, a simple comparison of Tables I and II above 
certainly shows that while the number of federal trials has been decreasing markedly, the 
number of arbitrations has been increasing markedly.  It is entirely reasonable to assume 
that at least some significant number of cases going to arbitration which would otherwise 
have ended up in a federal court are arbitrated principally because the prospect of a jury 
trial is a less desirable alternative.  Indeed, Judge Young specifically identified as a 
culprit in the demise of the jury trial the federal courts’ strong deference to arbitration, as 
reflected in federal judges’ “expansive reading” of the Federal Arbitration Act.13  He also 
called for amendment of that Act14 to return it to what he sees as its original, limited 
purposes: “expansive reading of the Federal Arbitration Act allows the unilateral 
imposition of arbitration clauses to trump all sorts of civil rights and consumer protection 
legislation.”15
Even if limitations imposed by the nature of the reported data preclude 
demonstrating, with robust statistical significance, a direct causal relationship between 
declining federal trials and increasing arbitrations, arbitration is, at the very least, 
perceived as an attractive alternative forum by both those with disputes, who increasingly 
13 Young, supra note 3, at 33.
14 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
15 Young, supra note 3, at 33.
Table II
American Arbitration Association    
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seek it, and at least one responsible member of the federal judiciary, viz., Chief Judge 
Young.  This observation leads us to suggest that fora can and do compete in the market 
for litigation, and that litigation will move, in obedience to ordinary market forces, to the 
most economically efficient forum.
A Lesson from Legal History
To a large extent, the history of the development of the legal system of England 
from the time of the Norman Conquest through the end of the Eighteenth Century is the 
story of evolving notions of jurisdiction (in the sense of a forum’s willingness to entertain 
a case). This evolution was powered by the interacting self-interests of fora and litigants.
By the 15th century, the jurisdictions of the two superior national courts of 
England, within bounds set by Magna Carta,16 had become fairly well settled by tradition 
and usage:  King’s Bench had jurisdiction over matters in which the Crown had an 
interest, while Common Pleas handled private disputes.17  Until the Crown fell into the 
hands of the Tudors at the end of the War of the Roses, the King’s Bench was not a busy 
court, as compared to Common Pleas: “Its records filled only a few hundred skins a year, 
whereas those of Common Pleas filled a thousand or two.”18  During the 15th century, 
both of the superior courts experienced a migration of litigation to alternative fora, i.e., 
the King’s Council and Chancery, where business was taken by “common lawyers, who 
resorted to them because of the attraction of their relative informality, the ease with 
which defendants could be arrested, and the inquisitorial method of investigation which 
bypassed the sheriff and the jury.”19
Their “initial success was perceived as a threat to the business of the common-law 
courts.”20  This loss of judicial business principally impacted the King’s Bench, which 
reacted by developing “swift process and procedure to vie with that of the Chancery, and 
acquired a jurisdiction over most common pleas by a combination of procedural 
devices.”21  This did not sit well with Common Pleas, resulting in the “legal disputes of 
the later sixteenth century [which] took on the appearance of an internecine struggle for 
business between the common-law courts themselves.”22  Although the personnel of
King’s Bench had a personal stake “in furthering this amplification of their jurisdiction, 
they were at the same time meeting strong popular demand.”23  The key point for the 
present analysis is that “popular demand” was Adam Smith’s invisible hand, quietly 
guiding disputes into the forum where they could be resolved at least cost (risk being a 
form of cost):  “The principal competitors were not the judges or officers [of the courts] 
16 MAGNA CARTA, cl. 17.
17 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 38  (4th ed. 2002).
18 Id.




23 Id. at 41.
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themselves but the litigants and their lawyers, shopping for the most advantageous 
forum.”24
King’s Bench, in particular, went to lengths in order to attract more business.   In 
the 16th Century, King’s Bench “wooed litigants with competitive costs, and sometimes 
even lowered its fees in order to increase the overall takings,”25 a universal practice of the 
volume seller.  Jurisdictional expansion was accomplished by a device labeled the “bill of 
Middlesex,” which got around cumbersome, older mechanisms for acquiring jurisdiction 
over the defendant’s person by alleging a fictional trespass occurring in the County of 
Middlesex, where King’s Bench sat.  There would be an allegation that the defendant had 
trespassed against the plaintiff in Hendon, and “[i]t mattered not whether the plaintiff or 
defendant had ever set foot in Hendon, or even Middlesex.”;26 the fictional trespass 
would simply be disregarded, while the dispute proceeded to be resolved on its merits 
according to the common law, whether in trespass or in debt or detinue.  The net effect of 
all this was to increase the business of the King’s Bench by a factor of ten between 1560 
and 1640.27  This increase was clearly the result of competitive behavior on the part of 
King’s Bench, which “had no monopoly, and … thrived only by satisfying litigants and 
the profession at large.”28
Although Common Pleas attempted to meet the competition, it was bound to the 
ancient, cumbersome writ procedure for acquiring jurisdiction, and it could not resort to 
any fiction as convenient as the Bill of Middlesex.  Furthermore, it was not economically 
competitive, as “it failed to make substantial reductions in its own scale of costs, 
allegedly because the three prothonotaries could never reach agreement on any specific 
proposal for the cuts.”29  The Common Pleas did not see an overall diminution in its 
caseload, as there was an overall increase in litigation during this period.  Common Pleas’ 
bar was ten times larger than that of King’s Bench, and it included a substantial number 
of attorneys who practiced throughout the country, rather than simply at Westminster.30
Thus, “the business of the Common Pleas increased considerably during the sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries, albeit at a slower rate than that of the King’s Bench.”31
Interestingly, the end of the King’s Bench-Common Pleas competition was 
accomplished both by legislation in 1661 designed to cut back on King’s Bench’s 
jurisdictional fictions32 and by Common Pleas’ own adoption of a jurisdiction-enhancing 
fiction in 1675.33
24 Id.  (Although, perhaps “actors” or “determinants” would have been a more apt term than 
“competitors.”) 
25 Id. at 42
26 Id.
27 Id. at 43
28 Id. at 44.
29 Id. at 45.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 STAT. 13 CAR. II (SESS. II), c.2
33 Baker, supra note 17, at 47. 
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Why did these courts compete with each other for business in the first place 
throughout the 16th and 17th centuries?  Other than professional pride and prejudice, the 
most compelling motivation was the compensation of judges and other court officers.  It 
was not until much later that the concept of English judicial and quasi-judicial office as a 
property right to be held in freehold,34 capable of being bought and sold, died out; 
remuneration of the judge in the form of fees35 was not replaced by a stated annual salary 
until 1826.36  In the period of intense jurisdictional competition discussed above, put 
simply, more litigation meant more money lining the judicial robe.  The courts were 
acting, in large part, out of selfish economic considerations when establishing their 
jurisdictions and setting their procedures.37
Interestingly, friction between the arbitral forum itself and the common law courts 
from economic competition can be traced back to the same period of inter-judicial 
competition addressed above.  The great legal historian and Chancellor Lord Campbell 
observed:
There was no disguising the fact that, as formerly, the emoluments of the Judges depended 
mainly, or almost entirely, upon fees, and as they had no fixed salaries, there was great 
competition to get as much as possible of litigation into Westminster Hall for the division of 
the spoil * * * And they had great jealousy of arbitrations whereby Westminster Hall was 
robbed of those cases which came not into Kings Bench, nor the Common Pleas, nor the 
Exchequer. Therefore they said that the courts ought not to be ousted of their jurisdiction, and 
that it was contrary to the policy of the law to do so. That really grew up only subsequently to 
the time of Lord Coke, and a saying of his was the foundation of the doctrine.38
The Jury’s In
The archetypal Anglo-American dispute resolution mechanism is, of course, the 
trial of issues of fact before the jury.39  Juries in English law predate the Norman 
Conquest. Over many centuries, and for a number of reasons, the jury’s character 
underwent a remarkable change.  With small license, the modern jury can conveniently 
be thought of as having evolved markedly from its ancestor, a group of locals essentially 
called as witnesses and sworn to speak the true facts as they knew them to the King’s 
justices, as those justices came to the shires from the seat of government to extend the 
King’s writ and to exercise his judicial power.  During the 14th Century, the jury 
gradually was transformed into a more neutral body of fact-finders, who were not 
expected to have first-hand knowledge of the disputants or their dispute.  Judges 
34 Id. at 112; see also, D.L. KIER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN 390 (9th ed. 1969). 
35 Sometimes, the fees, especially in Chancery, could be enormously lucrative.  See, Baker, supra note 17, 
at 112.
36 Kier, supra note 34, at 390.
37 For a collection of other authorities commenting on judges’ fees as a jurisdictional factor, see Kulukundis 
Shipping Co. S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 n.16 (2d Cir. 1942).
38 Kulukundis, Id. n.35 (quoting Scott v. Avery, 25 L.J.Ex. 308, 313).  In Kulukundis, Judge Frank, writing 
for the Court, famously quipped about the doctrine under discussion: “Give a bad dogma a good name and 
its bite may become as bad as its bark.” Id. at 983.
39 The discussion in the accompanying text is drawn primarily from Baker, supra note 17, at 72-75.
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exercised tremendous control over juries, and could even attaint them for a false 
verdict.40  Except for this element of judicial control, the modern American jury has not 
changed much its basic role in the legal process from its Tudor ancestor to the present, 
though, as will be shown, it has changed markedly in its composition and – at least in 
England – its utilization.
The English civil jury, ancestor of America’s, has fallen into almost complete 
desuetude, with what, in historical perspective, has been remarkable swiftness.  It started 
with the enactment of the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854,41 enabling the parties to 
consent to fact-finding by the judge, as “[a]ll the experience suggested that judges were 
more likely to understand the factual issues than laymen, and were as competent to assess 
evidence.”42  The decline was not only swift, it was broad: “In the course of the twentieth 
century, however, the alternative of jury trial more or less disappeared.  The very 
existence of an option made the decision to ask for a jury suspicious: it suggested the 
hope of confusion in a weak case, or the expectation of exorbitant damages in cases 
involving distressing details or high feelings … Since 1933 parties have been allowed 
juries only with leave of court, except in cases of libel and a few other matters; and the 
courts have indicated their unwillingness to give such leave.”43 These developments are 
all the more remarkable because they took place without legislation, by the common 
consent of the participants in the English public adjudication market, primarily English 
lawyers (who have been historically precluded from taking cases on a contingent fee 
basis).  In short, the market for civil jury trials in England simply dried up.
American federal courts, of course, do not enjoy the ability of their English 
cousins simply to dispense with the civil jury as unreliable or outmoded.  The Seventh 
Amendment to the Constitution guarantees most federal civil litigants44 a jury trial when 
40 Baker, supra note 17, at 136.  Service on a mediaeval jury could be extremely unpleasant, and modern 
jurors who object to serving could properly be reminded of the ancient rigors: “After their charge, the 
jurors were confined ‘without meat, drink, fire or candle’, or conversation with others, until they were 
agreed; and if they could not agree they were supposed to be carried round the circuit in a cart until they 
did.  The merest suspicion of misbehaviour was punishable, and we read of Tudor jurors being fined for 
eating sweets.”  The accompanying footnote reports that, “In 1587, four jurors were fined merely for being 
in possession of raisins and plums.”  
41 17 & 18 Vict. c.125.
42 Baker, supra note 17, at 92.
43 Id.  Although juries are still used in serious criminal cases in England, the Blair Government tried as 
recently as July, 2003, to do away with them in a range of complex and difficult cases.  The Government’s 
proposal was effectively defeated in the House of Lords.  See, “House of Lords Overturns Government 
Plan to End Trial by Jury for Complex Fraud Cases,” Associated Press, July 16, 2003.  This led to one of 
the more interesting legal observations of all time.  The Home Office Minister, Baroness Scotland, QC, was 
quoted as having told ITV News, in reaction to the Lords’ decision, that the abolition of jury trials as 
sought by the Government was a “real reform.  We’re allowing the guilty really to have an opportunity to 
be found guilty.”  The Times of London 6 (July 17, 2003).
44 A noteworthy exception is a claim against the United States Government under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401 et seq.  Oddly enough, it seems that in waiving sovereign immunity for 
claims against the federal government, Congress did not repose sufficient trust in the jury system to grant 
claimants against the government the right to a jury trial.  In such cases, judges are the fact-finders on all 
issues, including damages.  The same is true of actions against foreign states removed to federal courts 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. section 1603(b).  For an interesting discussion of the constitutionality of the 
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the enormous sum of $20.00 is in controversy,45 and many state constitutions provide 
similar guarantees. 
The jury of the Seventh Amendment’s Age of Enlightenment and the modern civil 
trial jury are, however, two very different institutions.  Again, history is instructive.
Alexis de Tocqueville praised the common-law jury of his age, calling it “as 
direct and extreme consequence of the sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage.”46
Of course, it is well known that suffrage in America at the time of de Tocqueville was far 
from universal; indeed, it was not until much later that traditionally excluded groups 
(women of all races and African-Americans) gained the right to vote.47  And what of 
juries?  Were they, in de Tocqueville’s day, as far from representative of the general 
population as was the electorate?  Surprisingly, at least in the federal courts, they were, 
and, more surprisingly, they remained so until well into the latter half of the 20th Century. 
Indeed, it has been said that “Eighteenth-century juries were…`the Rotarians of their 
day.’”48
The procedure for assembling a jury venire in the federal district courts was not 
made uniform throughout the country until enactment of the Jury Selection and Service 
Act of 1968.49  Before that Act, most federal juries were selected by the “key man”50
system.  The chief judge of the District selected a “key man” who would assemble a 
venire for a term of court, calling upon individuals personally known or recommended to 
him who would make “good” jurors, in his estimation.  From this venire, the petit juries 
were empanelled at trial, after voir dire conducted by the trial judge.  As the legislative 
history of the 1968 Act so eloquently understated it, “Often the [key man] system results 
in under representation of craftsmen, service workers, and laborers as compared with the 
professional and managerial classes.”51  In fact, the federal trial jury known to the 
previous generation of lawyers was a select jury.
immunity from jury trial given foreign states, see, In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on 
October 31, 1994, 96 F.3d 932, 945-47 (7th Cir. 1996).
45 Trial by jury is available under the Seventh Amendment when, judging by common law standards as of 
1791, the claim is legal, rather than equitable, in nature, and the defendant is suable at law, again under 
1791 standards.  See, In re Air Crash Disaster, supra n. 44.  This produces the deliciously ironic result that, 
although the common law of England has essentially abandoned the civil jury trial, see note 43, supra, 
England’s former colonies (at least as a federal body) are forever stuck in the Eighteenth Century as to their 
obligation to give civil litigants a jury trial.  The Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a civil jury trial has 
historically been viewed as not binding on the States, see, Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1876), 
although recent “revisionist” academic thought about the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
takes a differing view. See, David Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS lAW 
JOURNAL 333, 335 (December, 2003).
46 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 29 (H. Reeve text 1945).
47 U.S. CONST. amends. XV and XIX, ratified in 1870 and 1920, respectively.
48 Paul D. Carrington, “The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections,” 1990 University of 
Chicago Legal; Forum 33, 57 (1990) (quoting Professor Morris Arnold).
49 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1861-1867.
50 The gender reference in this term is most likely inadvertently reflective of the reality.
51 H.R. Rep. No. 1076, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1794 n.1
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Surprisingly little is said in general English legal history texts about the method of 
jury selection at common law.52  We do know, however, that sheriffs of the counties 
played the key role in jury selection.  For example, in the course of discussing the general 
state of political and legal corruption in the 15th Century, one distinguished scholar noted, 
“[T]he sheriffs were the tools of greater men, and, through their power over juries, the 
law of the country was at their mercy.”53  The so-called “gentleman jury,” impaneled by 
the sheriff for important cases, was limited by law to gentlemen of what for the time was 
substantial wealth (“men of quality”) and, in some cases, required a venire to be 
assembled from those “legally entitled to be called esquire, or a person of high decree 
[sic], such as a banker, merchant, or the head of a dwelling rated at not less than one-
hundred pounds in a town of 20,000 or fifty pounds elsewhere.”54
The “gentleman jury,” moreover, was only one type of jury, and none of the 
others was very different in terms of its lack of inclusivity:
Four types of special juries existed in common law England.  The first type, the 
gentleman jury, consisted of men of high social or economic status.  The second type, the 
struck jury, was selected upon the demand of either party and consisted of principal 
landowners selected from a list of forty-eight names.  The third type, the professional 
jury, had members who possessed special knowledge or expertise.  The fourth and most 
unique type, the party jury, attempted to ensure a foreign defendant of fairness by 
encompassing only individuals who were the same race, sex, or origin as the defendant.55
Of course, the “key man” system utilized in federal practice until the late 1960s 
did not differ much in terms of its product from the subjective selection processes noted 
above and no doubt familiar to those who drafted the Seventh Amendment.56  And the 
practice was not much different in most state courts, select juries yielding only over time 
to those chosen, as today, from the populace at large (or some segment thereof, such as 
registered voters), more-or-less at random.57   The present, randomly-selected and 
minimally qualified (i.e., meeting only criteria such as having a driver’s license or being 
registered to vote) jury may be labeled the “modern” jury.
Judicial Economics
52 For example, there is no discussion of the mechanics of jury selection in the works of Baker or Kier cited 
in footnotes 17 and 34, supra.
53 J.E.A. Jolliffe, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 417 (4th ed. 1961).
54 Kristy Lee Bertelsen, From Specialized Courts to Specialized Juries: Calling for Professional Juries in 
Complex Civil Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE ADVOCACY 1, 9 (1998).
55 Id. at 8-9.
56 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (establishing the right to jury trial in federal actions at law with $20 or more in 
controversy).
57 Bertelsen, supra note 54, at 9-13.
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Of course, judges are no longer mulcted in fees (or, one hopes, in bribes),58 but 
are paid a stated salary, no matter how much or how little judicial business comes before 
them.  Thus, they certainly no longer have any financial motive to increase the judicial 
business of the courts on which they serve; rather, if there is too much judicial business, 
there may be an incentive to decrease it.59  While this lends itself readily to the 
suggestion that judges are selfishly abandoning their duties, for example, by unjustifiably 
granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment,60 an examination of their actions 
alone is misdirected, though understandable; there is a natural tendency to assign
responsibility for the courts’ business to those who run them, i.e., the federal judges.  
However, it is not a lack of judges’ services (supply) that is shifting the market to ADR.
In fact, the shortfall is in demand for the ultimate exercise of judicial authority – the trial 
– which can spring only from the population of litigants.
Much has been written addressing the rising costs of litigation, most of which 
focuses on the cost and delay associated with a modern jury trial of the facts.61  Time has 
always been equated with money, as the old saying bears witnesses, and the delay and 
added work associated with the jury trial burden both sides.  For example, the hiring of 
jury consultants to help tailor the jury panel, through peremptory challenges, to one 
perceived as more predisposed to the consultant’s client has become popular.62  Why 
would a litigant add to the cost of litigation as it approaches trial and faces mounting 
expenditures?  The answer lies in the fact and the perception of risk in today’s jury 
system.  We assume this has not been previously addressed much in depth because some
of the relevant economic literature is fairly recent, and the factors involved are not 
explicit costs in classic economic theory.
As history demonstrates, there is a market in dispute resolution, and there is no 
reason to think it behaves any differently than other markets.  In today’s adjudication 
market, a driving force is undoubtedly the implicit cost of the jury – the risk that comes 
from the jury’s uncertainty of outcome.  Modern market theory, well established and 
58 See Baker, supra note 17, at 112 (discussing Bacon’s and Macclesfield’s dismissals as Chancellor on 
account of “accepting ‘presents’”).
59 A prominent legal scholar has recently taken the federal judiciary to task for overzealous grants of 
(mostly defendants’) motions for summary judgment, in part because some judges tend to use summary 
judgment as a docket-clearing tool (i.e., granting summary judgment motions in close cases that probably 
ought to go to trial) to cope with a “litigation explosion” that is, to Miller, more imagined than real: “A 
cynic might say, therefore, that ‘getting it right’ no longer is near the top of the priority list, indeed, it may 
well rank below ‘getting it over with’”.  See, A. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the ‘Litigation 
Explosion,’ ‘Liability Crisis,’ and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments? 78 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 982, 1003 (June, 2003).  
60 Id.
61 For example, former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger called the judicial system “too costly, too painful, 
too destructive, and too inefficient for a truly civilized society” in a speech to the American Bar 
Association (Feb. 12, 1984).   Mid-Year Meeting of the American Bar Association, 52 U.S.L.W. 2471 
(1984). 
62  “By the mid-1990s, the jury consulting business was estimated to have passed $200 million in annual 
revenues, mostly catering to lawyers handling civil cases….”  Walter K. Olson, Courting Stupidity: Why 
Smart Lawyers Pick Dumb Juries,” REASON 1.03 at 25 (January 2003).
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accepted in the field of economics, tells us that bearing risk63 is work, just like any other, 
and is compensated as such.  Merging the mathematics of probability with economics, a 
theory has emerged that can be applied to the instant situation.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers will inevitably seek to maximize fees, taking advantage of the 
so-called “American rule” that tolerates contingency fees.  This is a prime example of 
risk and reward: the higher the risk, the higher must be the offsetting reward.  Once 
assessed, risk can be divided into two kinds, “systemic” and “non-systemic.”  These 
categories of risk can be applied to the judicial system if we consider the payoff from a 
case – whether it be an award or the avoidance thereof – as a sort of legal “security.”
The behavior of the securities market has been the subject of considerable study.  
In that market, non-systemic risk describes uncertainties associated with a particular 
security.  In law, non-systemic risk would be the unknowns of an individual case, such as 
a client’s information not divulged to counsel or uncertainty of outcome.  (Indeed, a 
certain amount of risk is necessary to have a live case or controversy, the risk being 
uncertainty about the applicable law or the facts.)  In theory, non-systemic risk can be 
minimized, for example by diversification.  Thus, a plaintiff’s lawyer is likely to take, on 
a contingency basis, a range of cases with unknown probabilities of favorable outcomes, 
to maximize her potential to make a profit and limit losses.
In contrast, systemic risk applies to variables that affect multiple securities and 
those securities’ collective response.  Having factored out non-systemic risk, evaluating 
systemic risk allows careful investors to choose precisely the amount of risk they wish to 
bear and, accordingly, the compensation they wish to receive.  Investing is again 
illustrative, as in the simple case of bonds versus stocks.  An investor with a long time 
horizon would choose a diversified portfolio of stocks, which are far riskier, but bring 
higher reward.  Nearing retirement, the investor would move her money into bonds, 
giving up remuneration, but lowering her risk.  This phenomenon is reflected in the 
practice of law; it is generally true that those who practice in the less predictable areas of 
the law (such as plaintiff’s tort work) ask an accordingly higher compensation, usually in 
the form of a contingency fee that can run into the millions, as opposed to an hourly fee 
or “value billing.” But currently, salient legal risk depends less on the merits or 
circumstances of an individual case, or even its general type, than on the forum that 
entertains it.  If we think of the courts as stocks, and ADR as bonds, the modern jury 
brings systemic risk – especially from high-end outlier verdicts – to the courts.  Hence, 
the careful investor, in our case, the prudent lawyer, can maximize gains or – as many 
would see it – minimize losses by choosing one dispute resolution mechanism or the 
other.
In other words, the increasing variability of jury awards – especially the “outlier” 
verdicts at the upper extreme – makes the system economically inefficient, and this 
inefficiency creates excess profits and costs.  Returning to our earlier question, one such
cost is the fee of the jury consultant, who is hired in an attempt to reduce the variance 
introduced by the jury.  The money that a defendant’s jury consultant is paid can be 
63 Risk (or variability) may be measured mathematically as variance.
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thought of as a slice of the “pure profit pie” that the plaintiff’s lawyer might receive, were 
the consultants not able to advise their client to select a jury that minimizes the risk of an 
outlier verdict.
As mentioned above, there is evidence that, at bottom, it was the self-interest of 
litigants and their attorneys that dictated forum choice in the Tudor through Stuart 
periods.64  Self-interest, as a basic motivator of human behavior, of course, cannot be 
expected to have disappeared or diminished appreciably in the few hundred years since 
the jurisdictional wars of the English courts came to an end.  If a litigant has the power to 
maneuver the resolution of a dispute into a forum perceived as more advantageous to him
– whether from the standpoint of exposure to unpredictable high outlier verdicts, speed 
and cost of adjudication, or other factors – both common sense and microeconomic 
theory65 suggest that he will do so,66 as, for example, by inserting a binding arbitration 
clause or other sort of forum selection clause (e.g., home-state federal court only) in a 
contract.  And, of course, those same fundamental forces suggest that, if both sides 
perceive the advantage of one forum over another, they will mutually agree upon it, even 
if no agreement on dispute resolution was reached ex ante.  Such perceptions have 
various roots and take various forms.  For example, defense lawyers quite naturally and 
correctly perceive that a judge is less likely to award a huge amount of damages 
(especially for non-economic injury or punitive damages) than a jury (yet, there are data 
showing that plaintiffs have a higher mean success rate in a number of categories of cases 
(in terms of win/loss, not of damage award size) when a judge is the fact-finder).67 One 
should note, thought, that alternative dispute resolution does not always (or necessarily) 
benefit the defendant alone.  For example, the speed and low cost with which arbitration 
can settle a dispute may work in favor of the plaintiff’s attorney who handles a large 
volume of cases and/or is underwriting costs for an impecunious clientele.  Although 
there are arguably many possible costs and benefits that can steer either side towards a 
particular forum, economic theory (in particular, the Coase Theorem) states that, in the 
long run, actors in a market will seek efficiency by devising a way to divide the surplus 
created by adding value or, as in our case, eliminating waste.68  Thus, so long as both 
sides perceive that they can get “justice,” if it can be had at a lower cost, the dispute-
resolution process will inevitably migrate to the less expensive alternative.
64 Note 19, supra, and accompanying text.
65 One of the basic assumptions of economic theory is that actors are rational, in that they will always seek 
to minimize costs.  This creates problems when actors are ill informed or irrational, but one can safely 
assume that most litigants are neither.  To be sure, any lawyer or judge with extensive trial experience can 
relate tales of cases that no rational person would take to trial and that are tried only at the insistence of a 
litigant who wants to settle a grudge or make a point.  Such people frequently throw good money after bad 
– including attorney’s fees – but they form only a small part of the overall population of disputants; most 
people simply cannot afford to litigate with irrational motives.
66 Thus, pressure from segments of the Bar to preserve the existence of federal diversity jurisdiction – these 
days an anachronistic vestige of pre-Revolutionary distrust among Colonials – continues.
67 See Kent D. Syverud, ADR and the Decline of the American Civil Jury, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1935, 1939
(1997).




Of course, despite popular sentiment, there is not universal agreement that very 
high outlier verdicts or even a “litigation explosion” actually exist to a significant extent.  
In fact, Professor Arthur Miller, in an article cited earlier in this work,69 rests a large part 
of his argument against the overzealous grant of summary judgment on his perception 
that there has been no “litigation explosion.”70  He argues that, overall, the number of 
cases filed is not growing disproportionately to the population.  He also downplays a 
perceived rising tide in jury damage awards: “[A] RAND Institute of Civil Justice study 
finding that mean jury verdicts increased in Cook County and San Francisco…found that 
the median jury verdict figures, when certain procedural changes in San Francisco were 
accounted for, actually remained ‘strikingly stable’ over the twenty-five-year period.” 
(Emphasis in original)71  An increase, however, in the mean – but not the median – most 
likely reflects an increasing incidence of high-end outlying verdicts.  That is, it is 
reasonable to conclude that, as the high-end awards move higher, the variance in awards 
– and therefore risk – increases, because there is no reason to believe that, over the span 
of time studied, the bulk of verdicts became more concentrated around the median.  Even 
those who might doubt that the empirical evidence for variance substantiates perceptions 
of variance adduced by anecdotal evidence do not doubt the reality of the perceptions 
themselves and their effect on the vanishing jury trial.72
In short, drastic unpredictability inheres in the power of the jury (above and 
beyond its basic determination of a verdict on liability – a process which itself has come 
under academic scrutiny73 ) to fix damage awards, as it sees fit, with limited review, and 
with  reversal only in the most egregious cases, and even then, not often.  The jury can be 
seen as a sort of “black box” into which various versions of the facts are dumped and 
from which an unpredictable answer rolls out.  Certainly, no one suggests that the award 
of damages should be taken out of the jury’s province altogether, or that there is a need 
radically to overhaul theories underlying damage awards.  Indeed, scholars have shown 
that punitive damages are an efficient means to achieve proper deterrence.74 But
excessive damage awards have an inefficient over-deterrent effect.75  More importantly, 
the simple possibility of excessive damages – whether compensatory or punitive – raises 
costs for litigants across the board and affects the dynamics of settlement.  This 
phenomenon was noted in a recent law review article, in terms of its effect on “repeat 
player” defendants:  “[F]or insurance companies and other repeat litigants, a major goal 
69 Miller, supra note 59. 
70 Id. at 996
71 Id.. at 995
72 Sevyrud, supra note 67, at 1944-45. 
73 See Joe S. Cecil, Valerie P. Hans, and Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: 
Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U.L. REV. 727 (1991); see also Bertelsen, supra note 54..
74 See A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 869 (1998).  Generally, efficient punitive damages are the cost of an infraction inversely multiplied by 
the probability of being punished, such that the expected loss of breaking the law (the probability of losing 
in court multiplied by the punitive damages) becomes greater than the economic gain.
75 Id. at 879.
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(if not the major goal) in pretrial negotiations must be to avoid those huge verdicts that 
inflate the mean awards.”76  Economists might deem this whole situation, instead of a 
“litigation explosion,” a “verdict bubble.”
Legal economists have advanced numerous theories in an attempt to arrive at an 
efficient calculation of damages, concentrating on punitive damages, which, of course, 
are purely non-economic damages, i.e., are not premised upon any loss to the plaintiff 
reducible to dollars.77  One impediment to rationalizing the process is that jurors often 
encounter difficulty comprehending and implementing a judge’s instructions.78  A recent 
study has shown that even when presented with a model (e.g., the Polinsky-Shavell 
model) for determining punitive damages, jurors will arrive at “incorrect” determinations, 
i.e., those that are not efficient.79  Indeed, other research drawing on psychology has 
shown that factors such as so-called “benchmarks,” subconsciously set in the jurors’ 
minds by external sources such as the media, can be just as determinative as the factors 
that jurors “should” weigh to achieve an efficient outcome.80  What is most intriguing, 
and perhaps highly significant, is that jurors’ abilities to correctly weigh the factors that 
determine efficient damages seem to vary directly with demographic variables.81  The 
data suggest that jury awards are not only positively correlated to the demographic 
makeup of the jury, but also to other, broader socioeconomic factors, such as the poverty 
rate in the community from which the venire is drawn.82  Factor in group dynamics that 
actually tend to increase the variability of jury awards83 with random, cross-sectional jury 
selection, and the conclusion is inevitable that variability, risk, and costs all must be 
higher now than in the days of the select jury.84
The unpredictability and unreliability of modern jury discretion in fixing punitive 
damages has been well-documented, as discussed above.85  One would certainly expect 
the same sort of unpredictability and unreliability to inhere in an average jury’s ability to 
fix compensatory damages, particularly in light of the fact that jurors’ accuracy in 
determining punitive awards is directly correlated to their socioeconomic and educational 
background,86 a factor that would seem to figure equally in a compensatory damage 
76 S. Gross and K. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA 
REV. 1, 38 (October, 1996).
77 A number of solutions are presented in Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier 
Principle and its Alternatives, 97 MILR 2185 (1999).
78 Jury Comprehension in Complex Cases, A.B.A. Special Comm. of Jury Comprehension, Litigation Sec. 
(1989).
79 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 316
(2001) (“The mathematical formulas for guiding jury behavior in this experiment consequently achieve 
none of the purported objectives of the approach and remain vulnerable to the same kinds of contaminating 
influences that could distort punitive damage awards under the current regime.”)
80 Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for 
Reform, 50 BUFFALO L. REV. 103, 126-128 (2002)
81 Viscusi, supra note 79, at 338; see also E. Helland & A. Tabarrok, Race, Poverty, and American Tort 
Awards: Evidence from Three Data Sets, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 27 (Jan. 2003).
82 Helland, supra note 81.
83 Viscusi, supra note 79, at 334.  
84As previously mentioned, jury consultants make their profits by reducing precisely this variability.
85 Viscusi, supra note 79, at 316.
86 Id.
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calculation, especially for non-economic damages, such as pain and suffering. In such 
cases, juror sympathy or empathy can be played upon by a skillful plaintiff’s attorney like 
Perlman plays a fine Stradivarius.  We may safely speculate that research would show a 
general migration by defendants toward courts whose juries are drawn from the higher 
socioeconomic strata.  Indeed, removal of cases from urban state courts to federal courts 
(with venires drawn from suburban and rural areas as well as from the urban area) has 
been noted anecdotally as a favored tactic of the defense , as has avoidance of certain rural 
or depressed counties that are “plaintiff-friendly” in terms of high-end verdicts.87 In 
short, the social forces that brought about the demise of the select jury have injected an 
element of increased risk (flowing form unpredictability and variability at the highest 
end) that, at least in the perception of some of the users, renders the system inefficient.  
Obviously, there are potentially as many factors that could account for variance in 
verdicts among juries hearing similar cases as there are factual differences among cases, 
and we do not mean to suggest that the composition of the jury is the sole determinant of 
variance and unpredictability, but it is nonetheless a very important one that must be 
taken into account in explaining the lamented disappearance of the jury trial.
To find anecdotal evidence that the verdict bubble is real and is not a 
geographically isolated phenomenon, one need go no further than a major city’s 
classified telephone directory.  In one such East Coast directory, one finds advertisements 
for lawyers who have “won verdicts and settled cases involving millions of dollars...$3.3 
MILLION awarded for negligent death...$2.4 MILLION awarded...$3.35 MILLION 
awarded...$5 MILLION awarded...”88  A few pages later is an ad for a lawyer who claims 
damage awards won in amounts of $10,250,000, $4,100,000, $7,390,000, and 
$12,000,000, and who boasts that “juries just love him.”89  The perception of huge jury 
awards as normative – based perhaps on a factor as inherently unpredictable as a jury’s 
“love” for a particularly personable lawyer – is thusly formed. 
As the movie Wall Street’s fictional tycoon Richard Gekko noted, “Information is 
the most valuable commodity I know of.”90  This is true because it is information that 
drives markets to efficiency, or inefficiency.  While Miller notes, correctly, that “jury 
awards considered excessively high often are reduced by the court or by the parties 
themselves by way of settlement, or are reversed altogether on appeal[,]”91 the damage of 
unpredictable variance is done as soon as the verdict is returned.  Because these large 
awards form subliminal benchmarks92 for future jurors – and the initial verdict is sure to 
be the front page, while its reduction, if it comes, will get ½ column inch on page 23 –
the verdict bubble is a self-reinforcing phenomenon.  It matters not what the final 
outcomes of individual cases are, because the mere public perception of rising jury 
awards adds momentum to the same; this creates a trickle-down effect into settlements.  
If plaintiffs perceive even the slightest chance of receiving a very large verdict, the power 
87 See, e.g., Kenneth P. Nolan,  Tilting the Playing Field, 29 Litigation No. 3 at 6 (Spring 2003).
88 Advertisement for Marvin Ellin of Ellin & Baker, GREATER BALTIMORE SUPERPAGES 540 (Verizon, 
December 2002).
89 Advertisement for Stephen L. Snyder, Id. at 529.
90 WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987).
91 Miller, supra note 59, at 995.
92 See Robbennolt, supra note 80.
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of numbers and expected returns93 substantially raises their leverage in demanding a 
settlement.94  In this way, the jury’s influence today extends beyond its immediate 
domain and raises costs for litigants across the board, above the level that represents 
efficiency.
The Verdict
Given sufficient information, markets will not tolerate inefficiencies.  The modern 
jury trial entails such an inefficiency.  To escape the real and perceived costs of the 
federal jury trial, litigants are flocking to arbitration and other forms of ADR.95  The 
expectation is that, there, plaintiffs will find the justice they seek, and defendants will be 
more likely to have their “punishment fit the crime,” thereby avoiding the “deep-pocket” 
phenomenon96 and optimizing the risk vs. benefit for both sides. 
The inescapable fact is that, unless prohibited from doing so, disputants will do as 
they please.  This is not to say that traditional trials will disappear.  But there are some 
often-overlooked aspects to the decline in tried cases that argue for again making the 
courts more attractive to litigants.  Most importantly, as dispute resolution moves out of 
the courts, society is necessarily deprived of a number of cases that could advance our 
body of law by adding new precedents.  And, as any lawyer knows, trials as learning 
opportunities for junior members of the bar are increasingly rare.  Many “litigators” have 
garnered most of their experience at depositions or in mock proceedings, thus 
diminishing the body of experiential learning, not to mention “war stories,” which 
themselves play an important educational role.
We have demonstrated that, like any market, the adjudication market is subject to 
forces beyond the control of any single actor, but the inputs of every actor undoubtedly 
influence the market.  Accordingly, those who think the federal courts should retain a 
significant part of the adjudication market should seriously consider making those courts 
93 Mathematically, the expected return is the sum of the products of all possible outcomes and their 
probabilities, a forward-looking weighted average.
94 Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, and Joseph P. Mastrosimone, Reining in Punitive Damages “Run 
Wild”: Proposals for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1003, 1012 (1999).
95 See Syverud, supra note 67. 
96 The “deep-pocket phenomenon” can apply not only to spuriously naming wealthy corporations as 
defendants, but to the fact that jurors tend to perceive corporations as simply having large amounts of assets, rather than 
as bundles of productive goods, as Justice O’Connor noted in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 
U.S. 443 (1993): 
Corporations are mere abstractions and, as such, are unlikely to be viewed with much sympathy. 
Moreover, they often represent a large accumulation of productive resources: jurors naturally think 
little of taking an otherwise large sum of money out of what appears to be an enormously larger 
pool of wealth. Finally, juries may feel privileged to correct perceived social ills stemming from 
unequal wealth distribution by transferring money from "wealthy" corporations to comparatively 
needier plaintiffs. 
Id. at 491 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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more attractive.  This requires the difficult step of questioning whether the modern jury, 
as an exercise in pure democracy, is the appropriate dispute-resolver for all cases, 
especially complex or otherwise difficult ones.  Commentators have questioned whether, 
for example, “it [is] fair to ask a millworker, school custodian, receptionist, plumber, 
nurse’s aid [sic], housewife, and others possessing no expertise in economics or 
accounting, to render an accurate verdict based on average variable cost determinations 
and consequences of inventory accounting?”97   The question might just as well have 
been put as to whether it makes sense to do so, a question that has been answered no in 
England and most other industrialized nations.98  One answer is to return, at least in 
complex commercial cases,99 to a more select jury than the “modern” one.100  Although, 
to be sure, any return to greater selectivity in jury venire selection according to 
educational achievement or particular expertise implicates sensitive social and, perhaps, 
constitutional questions,101 it certainly has been suggested in the literature.102  If such a 
course – even given adequate safeguards against intentional, invidious discrimination – is 
too politically unpalatable to be implemented, lesser measures to influence the 
sophistication of the venire can surely be undertaken without objection, e.g.,
discontinuation of the practice of granting automatic (whether de jure or de facto) 
exemptions to classes of individuals such as proprietors of businesses, doctors, and the 
97  Bertelsen, supra note 54. 
98 Id. at 2.
99  Such cases are apt to generate larger mean verdicts than personal injury cases, at least according to some 
research.  See, Gross and Syverud, supra note 76. 
100  Indeed, Lord Mansfield, perhaps the greatest common law judge of his (or, arguably, any other) day, 
was well-known for his use of special merchant juries, composed of people steeped in a particular trade, to 
judge mercantile disputes arising in that trade and to deliver “special verdicts” expounding the commercial 
interests’ view of the governing law.  In doing so, he was responding to a market demand, i.e., “pressure 
from the City [the merchant and financial interests centered in the City London] for the formulation of clear 
rules of mercantile law.”  Baker, supra note 15, at 351.  Lord Mansfield also used special juries in patent 
cases.  See, Morris v. Braunson, (No. 3) (1776) Mansfield MS.  After Mansfield’s death, however, his 
successors did not regularly continue the practice of utilizing merchant juries, probably because they lacked 
Mansfield’s ability to form special and personal bonds with commercial men.  See, C. Fifoot, Lord 
Mansfield 104 (1936).   
101  The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial, as it existed at common law, but it does not 
address jury composition or selection, or other incidents of civil jury trial.   See, Colgrove v. Battin, 413 
U.S. 149 (1973) (no constitutional impediment to 6-member juries in civil cases).  An argument can 
certainly be made, based on historical references earlier discussed in this article, that selectivity in jury 
empanelment was well-accepted at the time of the Revolution.  Supreme Court case law has addressed the 
right to be tried in a criminal case by a jury that is fairly representative of the community at large, see 
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975),  and has held that jurors in a civil case cannot be excluded from 
service on an invidious basis such as race, see, Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 
(1991), but it has not spoken to the constitutionality of a “select” or “expert” jury in civil cases that involve 
complex issues.  Of course, because the right to trial by jury is waivable, see note 8, supra, the parties may 
very well, with or without a suggestion from the trial judge, agree to a specially-qualified venire, just as 
they may agree to a non-Article III magistrate judge without Constitutional impediment.  Cf. Pacemaker 
Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix, 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 
(1984).   Finally, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the “key man” system of jury selection is not 
facially unconstitutional, most recently in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
102 See, e.g., Bertelsen, supra note 54, at 34.
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like.103  While the authors have not found any reported data, we seriously doubt that 
many executive officers of Fortune 500 companies are empanelled in jury venires, let 
alone actually serve as trial jurors.104
The bottom line is simply this:  Serious consideration should be given to offering
appropriate alternatives to the current jury selection process in appropriate cases if the 
federal courts are to continue to present a viable choice for those shopping for dispute 
resolution.  Otherwise, one can reasonably expect that the decline in cases reaching trial –
in favor of other forms of dispute resolution – can, on the basis of elemental market 
forces, be expected to continue at its present, fairly steady rate to some irreducible 
minimum, perhaps consisting mostly of suits involving irrational litigants105or those with 
nothing to lose by “rolling the dice.”  The question is whether resistance to jury reform
can be overcome by those in the position – and with the determination – to at least 
experiment with meaningful change.
103 See, e.g., Plan of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland for the Random Selection 
of Grand and Petit Jurors, at 4-5, available at 
www.mdd.uscourts.gov/GeneralInfo/Jury/JurySelectionPlan.pdf.
104  Of course, such high-powered people might be peremptorily challenged by one side or the other, but 
even the potential of their service as jurors could have a salutary effect on the process as a whole.
105 See note 64, supra. 
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This article takes a fresh look at the increasingly discussed topic of the 
scarcity of civil cases reaching trial in the Article III system.  The number of 
cases tried declined by more than one-fourth in the decade from 1989-1999, 
and the decline continued at about the same rate to the end of the latest year 
for which statistics are available, 2002, while ADR (particularly arbitrations) 
skyrocketed.
The authors examine the history of competing English courts 
(particularly Common Pleas and King’s Bench) for signs that, in fact, market 
competition can arise among dispute-resolving bodies.  They also apply 
economic analysis to the present flight from jury trials to ADR, examining 
the role of jury verdicts in the economics of forum choice, especially as 
relates to the “verdict bubble,” i.e., the perception engendered by reports of 
high-end verdicts.  
The authors conclude by suggesting that the federal courts might 
increase the attractiveness of the jury trial option by offering the possibility 
of a “select” jury in the appropriate case, with, for example, a venire 
specially qualified by education or experience in complex or technical cases, 
for which there is historical precedent.  
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